The Meaning of “Life”: The Morning-After-Pill, the Question of When Life Begins, and Judicial Review by Horst, Jason M.
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BEGINS, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
by Jason M. Horst 
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. 
When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, 
philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the 
judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is 
not in a position to speculate as to the answer.1
With the recent appointments of two Supreme Court justices widely viewed as 
“pro-life,” the moral, political, and legal debate over questions of the proper scope of 
constitutional limitations on abortion have rarely, if ever, been stronger.2 Indeed, South 
Dakota’s legislature has recently considered passing a statute specifically aimed at 
challenging Roe v. Wade, banning nearly all forms of abortion.3 Some have speculated 
that under the new makeup of the Supreme Court, Roe may eventually be overturned and 
the constitutional right to abortion eviscerated. For the time being, however, this Article 
will assume that federal courts will continue to interpret and apply abortion law in its 
current form.  
The question of when life begins remains central to the question of the abortion 
limitations. As quoted above, the Court in Roe purported to avoid answering this question 
in holding that the Constitution forbids States from prohibiting all abortions.4 To this 
point, the Court has been able to avoid dealing directly with this question. Even in 
declaring a State interest in protecting potential life “[e]ven in the earliest stages of 
 
1 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973). 
2 See Russell Shorto, Contra-Contraception, N.Y. TIMES § 6 (May 5, 2006).  
3 See id. 
4 Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. 
2pregnancy,” the Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,5 steered clear of any discussion 
of when pregnancy begins. Legal scholars from numerous camps of thought on judicial 
review would undoubtedly hail this as proper restraint from intrusion into the most moral 
of questions.  
New State efforts to apply abortion restrictions to the emergency contraceptive 
known as the morning-after-pill,6 however, threaten to make the Court’s deference short-
lived. According to its advertisements, the morning-after-pill provides women with the 
ability to prevent a pregnancy, defined as implantation in the uterus, within 3 days of 
having unprotected sex.7 Because the morning-after-pill operates in a way similar to pre-
intercourse contraceptives such as birth control pills and patches, but after sex and 
potentially after fertilization, there have been arguments made both that the morning-
after-pill is, as advertised, a contraceptive and also that it is abortion.8 Some States have 
begun efforts to apply its abortion regulations, such as parental notification statutes, to 
the morning after pill.9
This Article argues that such restrictions will likely lead to constitutional 
challenges in which the court may be forced to decide between abortion law and 
contraception law, a decision this Article argues is inextricably linked to a determination 
as to when life begins. This is so primarily because distinctions in the reasoning behind 
the Supreme Court’s contraception and abortion decisions suggest both that States have a 
 
5 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992). 
6 The morning-after-pill is a drug most commonly distributed under the brand name Plan B that is marketed 
as a contraceptive effective up to 3 days after unprotected sexual intercourse.  
7 How PlanB Works, available at http://www.go2planb.com/ForConsumers/AboutPlanB/HowItWorks.aspx. 
It is important to note that, at this point, this Article is not adopting any definition of pregnancy, but rather 
discussing simply the marketed function of the morning-after-pill.  
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3greater authority to regulate abortion and that the legal difference between the two hinges 
on the existence or non-existence of potential life.  
The prospect of judges answering the question of when potential life begins 
immediately draws cries about the inadequacies of judicial review in resolving such 
moral questions. This Article argues that judges should indeed engage actively in 
addressing the moral questions posed by restrictions on the morning-after-pill. The 
Article draws in large part upon Christopher Eisgruber’s premise that judges are 
democratic representatives of the American people and are well situated to decide moral 
questions on the basis of moral reasoning.10 
Indeed, judicial oversight is particularly appropriate because, when properly 
viewed, limitations on the morning-after-pill will not beg the question, but rather reflect 
the government’s answer to it. That is, applying general abortion regulations to the 
morning-after-pill, for example by enforcing a legislative determination that human life 
begins at the moment of fertilization, constitutes government imposition of its opinion as 
to when life begins. As such, these restrictions will often raise significant questions about 
State governments’ authority to so impose their moral positions, questions that even the 
staunchest opponents of active judicial review acknowledge are appropriate for judicial 
consideration.11 As discussed below, both structural considerations of federalism and 
enumeration of powers, and the invalidity of State imposition of belief dictate that State 
governments do not have this power. 
Because courts will still have to choose between abortion and contraception 
doctrine, the lack of any imposing State opinion does not remove the moral question. To 
 
10 See generally, CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 92 (2001).  
11 See, e.g. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 543 U.S. 507, 578 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
4the contrary, this scenario hoists the question of when life begins directly onto the courts. 
This Article contends that even in such situations judges properly can, and must, decide 
constitutional challenges to the morning-after-pill.  
This argument has the potential to raise majoritarian concerns about judges 
supplanting the will of a State’s people. These concerns are well intentioned, but they can 
be alleviated through proper jurisprudence. Judges should take care not to simply import 
their own moral views in making this determination. Instead, courts must, as best they 
can, adopt and apply a constitutional definition of abortion that is consistent with the 
American people’s beliefs regarding when pregnancy or potential life begins and how 
personal beliefs about this subject should impact reproductive rights. This complex set of 
beliefs should guide a court’s choice as to whether to consider the morning-after-pill 
contraception or abortion for constitutional purposes. Finally, the Article argues that in 
light of the American people’s beliefs regarding the effect their personal moral beliefs 
should have on personal freedoms, judges attempting to determine the point at which the 
Constitution recognizes the existence of potential life should adopt a presumption of 
invalidity for any definition that would impair individual personal freedoms. This 
presumption, however, should be rebuttable on a finding that a supermajority of the 
public believes that the existence of potential life at a particular point enjoys such 
widespread acceptance that it should affect the legal rights of even those who do not so 
believe.  
Part I establishes the possibility that State application of abortion restrictions to 
the morning-after-pill will result in the need for a court to decide whether the morning-
after-pill is contraception or abortion. Part II first argues that State governments do not 
5have the authority to impose their views regarding when life begins on the people in their 
States. Second, Part II argues for the propriety of judicial review as a mechanism for 
deciding whether to lump the morning-after-pill in with abortion or with contraception 
for constitutional purposes. Specifically, Part II argues that courts should adopt the 
rebuttable presumption described briefly above in order to honor the will of the American 
people themselves.  
I. State Application of Parental Consent Statutes to the Morning-after-pill Has the 
Potential to Force Courts Into Deciding When Life Begins 
 
As of the writing of this Article, the constitutional quandaries raised by State 
limitations on access to the morning-after-pill are hypothetical. The lawyers and scholars 
at this point are battling for the most part over whether States may properly require 
pharmacists to supply the morning-after-pill.12 This Part predicts, however, that budding 
State efforts to limit access to the morning-after-pill will inevitably result in 
constitutional challenges. Further, this Part will show that courts face a significant 
dilemma in hearing such challenges. There is at the very least a significant possibility that 
courts addressing these challenges could legitimately find the limits on access 
constitutional if they considered the morning-after-pill abortion, but unconstitutional if 
they considered the morning-after-pill contraception. Finally, this Part contends that 
because the morning-after-pill falls in between that which is universally thought of as 
abortion and that which is universally believed to be pure contraception, courts will find 
 
12 See, e.g., Marry K. Collins, Consciousness Clauses and Oral Contraceptives: Conscientious Objection or 
Calculated Obstruction?, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 37 (2006); Kelsey C. Brodsho, Patient Exprectations and 
Access to Prescription Medication Are Threatened by Pharmacist Conscience Clauses, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 327 (2005); Tony J. Kriesel, Pharmacists and the “Morning-After-Pill”: Creating Room for 
Conscience Behind the Counter, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 337 (2005); Comment, Cristina Arana 
Lumpkin, Does a Pharmacist Have the Right to Refuse to Fill a Prescription for Birth Control?, 60 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 105 (2005). 
6themselves in a position where it may be necessary to identify the point at which life 
begins.  
a. The Morning-after-pill Allows Women to Prevent Ovulation, 
Fertilization, or Implantation 
 
In order to understand why much of the State action that this Article argues will 
create constitutional questions affects the morning-after-pill, and indeed to understand 
much of the discussion that follows, we must understand how the morning-after-pill 
functions. This Article will not delve too deeply into the medical complexities that 
account of the morning-after-pill’s effectiveness.13 Rather, it provides only the most basic 
overview of the way the drug functions. 
The operative agent in the morning-after-pill is levongestrel.14 Advertisements for 
the drug state that it potentially serves three functions.15 The pill operates “mainly by 
stopping the release of an egg from the ovary, and may also prevent the fertilization of an 
egg.”16 Additionally, the drug “may also work by preventing it from attaching to the 
uterus (womb).”17 This latter process, commonly known as implantation, occurs after 
fertilization has already occurred.18 
Conclusive scientific evidence remains unavailable as to exactly how the 
morning-after-pill operates in any given case, due to the difficulty in determining exactly 
 
13 For a detailed scientific analysis of the morning-after-pill’s operation, see Horacio B. Croxatto et al., 
Mechanism of action of hormonal preparations used for emergency contraception: a review of the 
literature, 63 CONTRACEPTION 111, 112 (2001) and Roberto Rivera et al., The mechanism of action of 
hormonal contraceptives and intrauterine contraceptive devices, 181 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 
1263 (1999). 
14 What is Plan B?, available at http://www.go2planb.com/ForConsumers/AboutPlanB/WhatisPlanB.aspx.  
15 See How Plan B Works, http://www.go2planb.com/ForConsumers/AboutPlanB/HowItWorks.aspx 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 BARRY R. FURROW, ET AL, BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 85 (2004, 5th ed.). 
7when a woman ovulates19 and of determining whether pregnancy failure in the post-
ovulation period was due to want of fertilization or inability to implant.20 “With few 
exceptions, the fact that an entity or a process is altered by the treatment does not 
necessarily mean that it explains how pregnancy is prevented in real life situations.”21 
Some evidence does suggest that the effect that the morning-after-pill will have depends 
somewhat on the amount of time that has elapsed between intercourse and administration 
of the drug and may also depend on the time of ovulation.22 At least one study has shown 
that “effects [of the morning-after-pill] that prevent ovulation or fertilization are likely to 
be the main mechanism of action of emergency contraceptive pills.”23 This presumption 
was drawn from the fact that the pill’s efficacy diminishes the longer a woman waits to 
take it after intercourse.24 Other studies, however, lend more credence to the prospect that 
the morning-after-pill does have a post-fertilization effect,25 and nearly all studies show 
that the morning-after-pill creates physical conditions inhospitable for implantation.26 
Based upon the foregoing discussion, any legal analysis of limitation to access of 
the morning-after-pill must presume that, in at least some cases, the morning-after-pill 
causes a failure of fertilized eggs to implant in a woman’s uterus. The significance of this 
presumption, if not clear already, will quickly become evident.  
19 See Croxatto et al., supra note 11, at 118. 
20 See Kevin T. McMahon, Why Fear Ovulation Testing?, 28 ETHICS & MEDICS 3, 3 (June 2003). 
21 Croxatto et al., supra note 11, at 118. 
22 See Croxatto et al., supra note 11, at 118; Rivera et al., supra note 11, at 1265–66. 
23 Rivera et al., supra note 11, at 1266. But see McMahon, supra note 18, at 3 (citing another study 
suggesting that pregnancy rates in women who took emergency contraceptives were “‘consistent with a 
post-fertilization effect’”). 
24 See Rivera et al., supra note 11, at 1266. 
25 See McMahon, supra note 18, at 3; Croxatto et al., supra note 11, at 118; Rivera et al., supra note 11, at 
1265–66. 
26 See generally McMahon, supra note 18, at 3; Croxatto et al., supra note 11, at 118; Rivera et al., supra 
note 11, at 1265–66. 
8b. Ovulation, Fertilization, Implantation, and Beliefs About When Human 
Life Begins 
The medical definition of pregnancy, as set forth by the American Conference of 
Obstetrics and Gynecologists (“ACOG”), is the time between implantation and live birth 
or other termination.27 Were we all to accept this definition wholesale, this Article would 
indeed be a relatively simple undertaking. There is no debate that an abortion should be 
defined as anything other than the termination of a pregnancy. If there were likewise no 
dispute as to the fact that pregnancy begins at implantation, there would be no reason for 
courts to find otherwise.  
In fact, however, there are numerous other stages in human development that 
certain individuals believe should be considered to starting point of “the human 
individual.”28 Perhaps the most common answer to the question of when people believe 
human life begins would be fertilization.29 If this were true, a drug that prevents post-
fertilization development could reasonably be considered an abortifacient. Indeed, many 
believe this to be the case.30 
There are also those who believe that because genetic uniqueness is bestowed 
upon an oocyte (an egg) just before ovulation, the human individual begins at that point, 
even before fertilization.31 Such a belief may call into question whether even drugs or 
devices that prevent fertilization are properly named contraceptives. Others believe that a 
fetus does not become an individual until electrical brain activity begins, which takes 
 
27 AMERICAN CONFERENCE OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, ACOG TERMINOLOGY BULLETIN 1–2 
(1965). 
28 See generally C.R. AUSTIN , HUMAN EMBRYOS: THE DEBATE ON ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 22–31 (1989). 
Austin argues that because the eggs and sperm are clearly alive prior to fertilization, we are actually 
looking to when human individuality begins. Id.  
29 See id. at 22.  
30 See, e.g., McMahon, supra note 18, at 3–4. 
31 See AUSTIN, supra note 26.  
9place around twelve weeks after fertilization.32 Those who accept this view may thus 
consider the vast majority of abortions performed in the United States more akin to 
contraception. While this Article focuses primarily on the interval between fertilization 
and implantation it is important to note the widely divergent views in this area.  
c. Some State Governments Have Begun to Consider the Morning-after-pill 
to be Abortion or Adopt Restrictions Similar to Those on Abortion 
Social conservative politicians in several State governments have either attempted 
to apply parental consent abortion statutes to limit distribution of the morning-after-pill to 
minors or taken steps to create such statutes tailored specifically for the morning-after-
pill. Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney vetoed legislation designed to expand access 
to the morning-after-pill due to concerns about the lack of any parental notification 
requirement.33 Governor Romney felt that the statute, which included no age limitation 
on access to the morning-after-pill, would alter Massachusetts parental consent laws for 
abortion.34 Thus, Governor Romney assumed that the parental consent regulation for 
abortion in general already limited minors’ access to the morning-after-pill.  
Other States actually have statutes on their books that may implicitly direct State 
executives to treat the morning-after-pill as abortion.35 Missouri’s legislature has made 
official findings that “[t]he life of each human being begins at conception.”36 In 
Wisconsin, “‘Abortion’ means the use of an instrument, medicine, drug or other 
substance or device with intent to terminate the pregnancy of a woman known to be 
 
32 See id.  
33 Mitt Romney, Why I Vetoed Contraception Bill, BOSTON GLOBE A17 (July 26, 2005); Scott S. 
Greenberger, Lawmakers Override Governor’s Contraception Veto, Boston Globe B4 (September 16, 
2005). The Massachusetts Legislature overrode the Governor’s veto. Id. 
34 Id. 
35 See, e.g., MO. STAT. ANN. § 1.205(1) (Vernon’s 2006). 
36 Id. 
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pregnant or for whom there is reason to believe that she may be pregnant.”37 Either of 
these statutes arguably allows, and potentially even requires, State officials to enforce the 
States’ preexisting limitations on access to abortions against those seeking access to the 
morning-after-pill. Justice Stevens suggested as much, stating that the Missouri 
legislature’s finding that life begins at conception, defined “as ‘the fertilization of the 
ovum of a female by a sperm of a male . . . . implies regulation . . . of common forms of 
contraception such as . . . the morning-after-pill.”38 
Still other States are getting even more specific. The New Hampshire Legislature, 
for instance, is considering a bill that would require parental notification prior to a 
pharmacist dispensing the drug.39 
As discussed more thoroughly below, specifically tailored legislation is different 
in important ways from government action that makes the morning-after-pill an 
abortifacient under State law. On the surface, at least, the State is not regulating the pill 
out of a belief that it constitutes abortion. As we will see below, however, this difference 
does not likely go much deeper than the surface. Nearly every State has some sort of 
parental consent or notification statute on the books that would limit young women’s 
access to abortions.40 No State has a law that requires all minors to engage their parents 
in order to receive contraceptives.41 As such, it seems far from clear that the motivations 
related to abortion beliefs failed to influence legislation specifically tailored to the 
morning-after-pill. 
 
37 WISC. STAT. ANN. § 253.10(2)(a) (West 2006) (emphasis added).  
38 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 561, 563 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
39 Marc Kaufman, Plan B Contraceptive Battles Embroil States, WASH. POST (Bus. Sec.) (Feb. 27, 2006). 
40 See Guttmacher Institute,  
41 Rachael K. Jones & Heather Boonstra, Confidential Reproductive Health Services for Minors: The 
Potential Impact of Mandated Parental Involvement for Contraception, available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3618204.pdf.  
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d. Courts Hearing Constitutional Challenges to Such Actions May Have to 
Decide Whether to Apply Abortion or Contraception Law, a Decision 
Implicating the Question of When Life Begins 
 
Without question, the State actions described above will result in constitutional 
challenges brought by reproductive rights groups on behalf of women denied access to 
the morning-after-pill. This Part argues that applying or imposing restrictions such as 
parental notification or consent requirements to the morning-after-pill may be 
unconstitutional under contraception doctrine, but constitutional under abortion doctrine. 
Thus courts cannot necessarily avoid addressing the issue of when life begins in some 
way.  
i. The Effect of When Life Begins on State Authority to Regulate 
Abortion and Contraception 
Implicit in the reasoning of both the Supreme Court and lower federal courts 
ruling on abortion and contraception cases is an understanding both that the line that 
divides abortion and contraception is when life begins and that States have a greater 
authority to regulate abortion.  
One need not look further than the Supreme Court’s benchmark contraception and 
abortion cases in order to find evidence of courts’ treatment of contraception as prior to 
the origins of new human life and abortion as after. In Griswold v. Connecticut,42 neither 
the Court’s majority and concurring opinions nor its dissents refer to any interests beyond 
those of the individuals denied the right to contraceptive services.43 Roe, and Casey, on
the other hand, are replete with references to a State’s interest in preserving “potential 
life.”44 Indeed, Justice Blackmun’s lengthy opinion in Roe expressly distinguishes 
 
42 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
43 See generally id.
44 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162–64; Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992). 
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abortion from contraception, extending principles from Griswold, yet distinguishing it on 
the basis that a “pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy” due to the existence 
of potential life.45 The Casey Court went even further, placing an import on the State’s 
interest in protecting potential life great enough to balance, to a limited extent, against a 
woman’s fundamental right to choose whether to have an abortion. Without a finding that 
potential life existed at the time of an abortion, but not at the time of contraception, it is 
difficult to see why Roe was in any way a dramatic extension of Griswold, much less to 
explain why the public abortion debate remains so rich despite the relatively minimal 
clamor over the legality of contraception. 
Because abortion involves potential life and States have a legitimate interest in 
protecting that potential life, and because potential life and the corresponding State 
interest are not present in contraceptive choices, States have greater authority to regulate 
abortion decisions than contraception decisions. Courts do often conflate the 
constitutional standards with which to adjudicate State limitations on contraception with 
those used to evaluate abortion limitations.46 Even in doing so, however, courts 
acknowledge a distinction between the two standards; either implicitly or explicitly, 
courts scrutinize limitations on rights to use and access to contraception to a greater 
degree than they do abortion rights.47 Justice Brennan expressed this distinction clearly, 
stating that “[t]he State's interests in protection of the mental and physical health of the 
 
45 See Roe, 160–64. 
46 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Assn. of Utah v. Matheson, 582 F.Supp. 1001, 1007–09 (1983) (applying 
reasoning and holdings of various abortion decisions to a constitutional challenge to Utah law restricting 
State funds for contraception). 
47 See, e.g., id. at 1009 n.9 (reserving expressly the question as to whether a hypothetical parental consent 
statute that included some maturity evaluation process would pass constitutional muster despite earlier 
acknowledgment of abortion cases in which the Supreme Court found that such bypass procedures made 
otherwise unconstitutional parental consent statutes constitutional); Parents United for Better Schools v. 
School Dist. of Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 978 F.Supp. 197, 209 (1997) (stating that “States have even less 
interest in regulating minors’ access to contraception than in regulating minors’ access to abortion”). 
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pregnant minor, and in protection of potential life are clearly more implicated by the 
abortion decision than by the decision to use a nonhazardous contraceptive.”48 
ii. The Morning-after-pill Potentially Could Be Constitutionally 
Limited to Minors if Considered Abortion but Not if Considered 
Contraception 
Given the disparity in State authority over abortion and contraception decisions, 
there is a strong possibility that certain restrictions can be constitutionally applied to 
abortion decisions but not to contraceptive choices. For example, in the context of 
abortion, “the State may enact rules and regulations designed to encourage her to know 
that there are philosophic and social arguments of great weight that can be brought to 
bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full term and that there are procedures and 
institutions to allow adoption of unwanted children as well as a certain degree of State 
assistance if the mother chooses to raise the child herself.”49 The Casey Court held that 
this allowance justifies requirements that minors involve their parents in abortion 
decisions and that women wait twenty-four hours before having the procedure.50 
It is certainly possible that a court may find that morning-after-pill cases are 
distinguishable, given the wait might actually prove prohibitive in many cases due to the 
short window during which the drug is effective. Without question, some judges 
presented with the question would find that even if considered abortion, parental 
notification with judicial bypass or a twenty-four hour waiting period constitute an undue 
burden, and are therefore unconstitutional restraints. Such a holding has merit from the 
perspective of judicial restraint, as these courts would avoid the moral question at the 
heart of this Article.  
 
48 Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977). 
49 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992).  
50 See id.
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The problem with holding that the parental involvement statutes and waiting 
periods constitute an undue burden on teens is that such a holding necessarily rests on 
highly tenuous logic, given the Supreme Court’s current abortion jurisprudence. 
Especially in the case of parental notification and judicial bypass, Supreme Court cases 
holding these restraints on abortion are constitutional are based on the premise that, as a 
class, minors are less mature than adults, and hence less capable of making reasoned 
decisions.51 As such, the state has an interest in seeing that a mature adult can advise the 
minor in the decision-making process, or at least that the minor can be judged responsible 
enough to make the decision on her own. If one holds that a young woman need not be 
subject to such restrictions because of the time constraints involved in the morning-after 
pill, the holding necessarily rests on the premise that some right to choose the means of 
abortion outweigh any considerations of mature decision-making. The Supreme Court 
has yet to recognize any such right.  
Indeed, such a right would stand in direct conflict with the Court’s current 
doctrine. If it is a child’s maturity to make the decision without assistance that is at issue, 
it does not seem to follow that a right to choose one method of abortion over another 
should be given greater weight than the recognized state interest. There are two potential 
ways that one might reason otherwise. This first is that concerns over safety and 
invasiveness of particular methods must be taken into account in assessing whether it is 
constitutional to place certain limitations on minors seeking abortions. A woman’s health 
has certainly been recognized as a critical factor in abortion doctrine. Common early 
abortion methods, however, have become increasingly safe, such that concerns over 
safety are minimal. Invasiveness of alternative procedures may be a more substantial 
 
51 See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 458–59 (O’Connor, J. concurring).  
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argument. Nonetheless, this again requires the creation of previously unrecognized 
abortion rights. Thus, while it remains possible that a right to choose the means of your 
abortion should be a fundamental right, protected against a states interest in educated 
decision-making, judges cannot, at this point, comfortably rely on such a right to answer 
the question presented in this Article. 
Further, attacks on the constitutionality of particular methods of abortion runs 
afoul by failing to respect the current judicial understanding of abortion. The Supreme 
Court has made clear that where potential life is at issue, the state has an interest in 
protecting that potential life. As is discussed more thoroughly below, the Court’s 
emphasis on potential life as creating a state interest balanced against a woman’s 
unfettered right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy means that a finding that a 
particular procedure is abortion has a special significance. If the morning-after-pill is held 
to be abortion, the state may balance the potential life involved against a woman’s rights, 
and thus justify a number of restrictions on her access to the procedure.  
It is far from clear, however, that a State may constitutionally place the same 
restrictions on access to contraception. Indeed, at least one federal court has specifically 
acknowledged the possibility that the same kind of parental consent and notification laws, 
explicitly sanctioned by the Supreme Court in the context of abortion, may be 
unconstitutional as to contraception.52 
Moreover, Supreme Court doctrine currently requires very distinct formulas for 
analyzing abortion and contraception regulations. Pre-viability abortion regulations are 
analyzed under the “undue burden” standard articulated in Casey.53 There, the Court 
 
52 See Matheson, 582 F.Supp. at 1009 n.9. 
53 505 U.S. at 869–79. 
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made clear that it was disavowing a strict scrutiny standard for such regulations. To the 
contrary, the Court’s benchmark contraception decision uses the strongest of language in 
asserting that regulations touching contraceptive choices must meet strict scrutiny, 
serving a compelling State interest.54 Casey explicitly changed this standard in abortion 
cases, but the Court has not done so in the context of contraception. The result of these 
differing standards is that parental consent, informed consent, and waiting period laws, 
struck down only if they act as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s abortion decision, 
may have a harder time withstanding judicial scrutiny when applied to contraception 
decisions. 
In sum, there is a likelihood that regulations such as those currently being 
considered to limit access to the morning-after-pill, while constitutional under abortion 
law, are unconstitutional under contraception doctrine. Affirmatively proving this point 
would be an article unto itself. This Part has simply attempted to show that such a 
conclusion is a very real possibility.  
In the context of our larger discussion, the possibility that parental notification 
statutes and the like would be unconstitutional in the contraception context but not in the 
abortion context means that the constitutionality of limitations on access to the morning-
after-pill may hinge on whether courts consider it to be abortion or contraception. 
Likewise, the fact that the divide between contraception and abortion has been drawn at 
the beginning of pregnancy and the corresponding beginning of potential human life 
means that in order to decide whether the morning-after-pill is abortion or contraception 
 
54 Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977) (stating “‘Compelling’ is of course 
the key word; where a decision as fundamental as that whether to bear or beget a child is involved, 
regulations imposing a burden on it may be justified only by compelling State interests, and must be 
narrowly drawn to express only those interests”).  
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courts must decide whether it acts before or after the start of pregnancy. Courts cannot do 
so without deciding when pregnancy, when life, begins.  
Courts’ inclination will likely be to avoid this last question. They may be inclined 
instead to adopt some sort of continuum approach, treating the morning-after-pill as a 
step in-between abortion and contraception thus entitled to a mid-level protection against 
government intrusion. The nature of the distinction that this Part has discussed, however, 
sets abortion and contraception on either end of a miraculously bright line that allows for 
no in-between. Thus, if you accept the distinction drawn, and if there is a practical 
distinction in the treatment of statutes regulating abortion from those regulating 
contraception, the morning-after-pill must find a place on one side of that line or the 
other. The question then becomes how judges should decide which side the morning-
after-pill belongs on. 
II. Judges Should Decide Whether to Apply Abortion or Contraception Law to the 
Morning-after-pill in Light of Their Role as Representatives of the People 
 
This Part argues that Courts should decide whether to consider the morning-after-
pill abortion or contraception by adopting an approach to judicial review commensurate 
with Christopher Eisgruber’s theory that judges should act as representatives of the 
American people in deciding cases.55 Eisgruber has freely admitted that his work does not 
offer “constitutional judges any sort of ‘cookbook’ to get them through hard cases,” and 
has in fact argued that a general jurisprudential technique demanding “such ‘specificity is 
impossible or undesirable.’”56 To the contrary, this Article’s very purpose is to provide a 
cookbook of sorts for judges presented with the constitutional challenges to limitations on 
 
55 See generally EISGRUBER, supra note 8. 
56 Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government and Judicial Review: A Reply to Five Critics,
37 U.S.F. L. REV. 115, 179 (2002). 
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access to the morning-after-pill. This should not be confused, however, with an attempt to 
set out a jurisprudential technique of general applicability. Rather than adopting 
Eisgruber’s theory only to reject one of its central premises, 
 this Article proposes methodology that aims to be both limited to the set of facts 
we have discussed and true to a judge’s role as a representative of the American people. 
The Article does not offer a definitive answer to this question, but simply presents an 
analytical framework for judges to use and some factors they might consider.  
The Article argues that constitutional courts must attempt to determine the 
American people’s beliefs as to the question of whether the morning-after-pill should be 
treated as contraception or as abortion for constitutional purposes. This Part first argues 
that State governments have no authority to adopt views as to when life begins and then 
impose those views on the people within the State. It explains that federalism and 
institutional considerations dictate against allowing State legislators and executives to 
define the federal Constitution. Further, States lack authority in this area because it is a 
matter purely of belief, and a State may not justify its laws based on belief alone.  
Second, this Part presents a framework through which judges can                              
attempt to derive the American people’s view as to whether courts should consider the 
morning-after-pill abortion or contraception. This inquiry great complexity, for it 
involves a probe, not only of the people’s views on the question of when life begins, but 
also, and more importantly on the effect that the American people believe that their 
individual views should have on the legal rights of others. This Part argues that, for the 
most part, Americans believe that their moral opinions should not affect the personal 
freedoms of others. Nonetheless, Americans do have a tipping point at which they a 
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belief is shared widely enough and felt strongly enough that Americans believe the belief 
should impact legal rights.  
As such, the Article proposes that judges adopt a framework that treats any 
constitutional interpretation as to the beginning of life presumptively improper if it would 
adversely affect individuals’ personal freedoms. While this is a sweeping presumption, it 
is consistent with the American people’s feelings about the effect their moral beliefs 
should have on the legal treatment of their peers, at least as applied to the context of 
reproductive decisions. Further, the Article proposes that the presumption may be 
rebutted on a finding that a supermajority of the American people believe both in the 
moral premise and in the premise that it should have legal force. This allows judges to 
honor the exceptional circumstances in which Americans feel there is such a consensus 
regarding an issue of great import that moral beliefs may play a role in defining the law 
even at the cost of personal freedoms. This super-majoritarian concept is reconcilable 
with constitutional structure, Supreme Court precedent on reproductive rights under 
substantive due process, and the thinking at the heart of our criminal law. 
Because evidence of the American people’s beliefs as to each of these questions 
will not always be readily available, judges will often have to exercise moral reasoning in 
attempt to derive them. The people, however, also have a desire to see “moral issues” 
decided on the basis of moral reasons that have some popular appeal.”57 As such, this 
Article echoes Eisgruber’s call for judges to exercise their own reasoning in deciding 
what effect the views of the majority of Americans should have on the legal rights of 
their peers.  
 
57 EISGRUBER, supra note 8 at 57. 
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The piece of the proposed analytic framework that calls on judges to undertake an 
independent analysis immediately draws concerns regarding substitution of judicial 
morality for that of the people. Considered as a whole, however, the analysis set forth 
below lessens the need for this concern by recommending independent judicial reasoning 
be used in light of critical empirical analysis of the American people’s views, rather than 
as a lone mechanism of decision-making. A judge’s role requires not only deriving the 
will of the majority of Americans (even through reasoned analysis of the people’s beliefs 
that transcends simple counting of hands at the polling place), but also undertaking a 
reasoned analysis to ensure that the effect the majority’s beliefs have on specific issues 
are consistent with their principles. Courts, for example, should protect against violation 
of individual rights, even through majority decision-making. Ronald Dworkin has 
expressed that “[r]ights . . . are best understood as trumps over some background 
justification for political decisions that States a goal for the community as a whole.”58 
This Article suggests that rights are, in fact, broader goals for the community in 
themselves, goals that often supercede the community’s issue-specific goals. As such, 
courts deciding whether to consider the morning-after-pill abortion or contraception must 
evaluate the American people’s view as when life begins, and then assess the people’s 
views as to how rights and other considerations should effect the governmental 
application of their issue-specific beliefs. 
a. State Government Authority to Impose Its Opinion as to When Life 
Begins 
 
All of the contexts in which States limit access to the morning-after-pill seem to 
involve the application of a State government’s opinion as to when life begins. Certainly 
 
58 RONALD M. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 359 (1985).  
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this is true of affirmative declarations by State legislatures that life begins at conception 
and State actions applying existing abortion laws to the morning-after-pill. The point may 
also be applicable to State legislative action specifically attacking access to the morning-
after-pill. As indicated above, no State has a law that requires all minors to engage their 
parents in order to receive contraceptives.59 Legislative beliefs that life begins at 
conception thus seem the likely reason for placing such restrictions on access to the 
morning-after-pill.60 Foremost, if one accepts the possibility set forth above—that the 
regulations States are placing on the morning-after-pill are constitutional under abortion 
law and may be unconstitutional under contraception law and that there is no in-
between—States may be in a position that they can defend their restrictions on access to 
the morning-after-pill only by asserting that the drug causes abortion, that it terminates 
existing potential human life.  
It is quite likely that a number of women seeking access to the morning-after-pill 
will not share this view. The question, then, is what level of deference, if any, should 
constitutional courts give to a State’s determination that the morning-after-pill is abortion 
in the face of challenges brought by those that believe otherwise? This Part argues that 
the determination should receive no deference. 
At first blush this position might seem somewhat extreme. Should State 
governments not have the first crack at adopting definitional standards of law? States are 
allowed to legislate definitions of death in the context of murder statutes, organ 
donations, estates, torts etc, why not allow them to define life? On closer examination, 
 
59 Rachael K. Jones & Heather Boonstra, Confidential Reproductive Health Services for Minors: The 
Potential Impact of Mandated Parental Involvement for Contraception, available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3618204.pdf.  
60 See Romney, supra note 31, at A17; Greenberger, supra note 31, at B4. 
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however, it becomes clear that States have no business defining the morning-after-pill 
either as contraceptive or abortifacient because the definitional question presents a 
combination of constitutional interpretation and religious belief, neither of which fall 
within the proscriptive powers of the States.  
Belief is a key word here. There is no scientific proof, nor can there likely ever be 
any such proof, of when human life begins, when one is ensouled, for those who believe 
in a human soul. All that exists is a series of individual and collective beliefs about when 
(and if) this happens. Yet, as Roe and Casey make clear, the constitutional considerations 
involved in reviewing a particular method of preventing live birth depend greatly on 
whether the practice takes place before or after the beginning of pregnancy—whether 
there is potential life to consider.61 
At issue, then, is not an individual State’s definition of pregnancy or when life 
begins, but rather the constitutional definition. The question to answer, therefore, is not 
necessarily whether life begins at conception or implantation, but rather at which of these 
points (or at what other point) the Constitution should recognize the existence of potential 
life. And all we have to go on is belief.  
In this context, a picture of why States may not take the first bite at the 
definitional apple begins to emerge. It could not reasonably be said that a State’s 
definition of condom use as abortion would receive any deference from a federal court 
today. Nor would a definition of pregnancy that commences twelve weeks after 
implantation, such that the vast majority of procedures now commonly considered 
abortion would be defined as contraception. But why? 
 
61 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162–64; Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992). 
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There are two primary reasons. First, because the situation involves interpretation 
of the federal Constitution, federalism and enumeration of powers make this question one 
for the federal judiciary, not the State legislature and executive. Second, the State 
imposition of a religious belief on the people within, having the practical effect of 
limiting individual rights, offends substantive due process principals. 
i. State Authority over Constitutional Interpretation 
 
Once we understand that the pivotal question presented by challenges to 
restrictions on access to the morning-after-pill, unlike the majority of challenges to State 
regulations on those within its jurisdiction, is one of federal constitutional meaning, it is 
clear that federalism principles foreclose States from speaking with authority on the 
subject. As Justice Story expressed just thirty years after the Constitution’s ratification: 
“It is manifest that the constitution has proceeded upon a theory of its own, and given or 
withheld powers according to the judgment of the American people, by whom it was 
adopted.”62 The American people gave the new federal government the authority and 
ability to make and interpret its own laws, which would be binding on the States, despite 
the considerable retention of States’ sovereignty within their jurisdictions. As such, 
federalism requires that federal courts have final say over determinations of federal law.63 
This allows for a necessary uniformity in federal law throughout the States.64 Nowhere is 
such uniformity so important as in treatment of interpretive questions such as when the 
Constitution should first recognize potential life.  
 
62 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. (14 U.S.) 304, 346–47 (1816). 
63 See id. at 347 (stating that “reasons of a higher and more extensive nature, touching the safety, peace, and 
sovereignty of the nation, might well justify a grant of exclusive jurisdiction); see also 16B CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT ET. AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4006 (2d ed. 2005). 
64 See Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. (14 U.S.); WRIGHT, supra note 63, at § 4006. 
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It is certainly true that State courts play some role in constitutional jurisprudence. 
The Constitution makes this much clear through the Supremacy Clause.65 Indeed, nothing 
in this Article should be construed to argue that State courts may not have a go at the 
constitutional question involved in challenges on restrictions to the morning-after-pill.  
Indeed, while the federal judiciary and ultimately the Supreme Court will have the final 
word, many of these challenges may originate in State courts. This Article intends to lay 
down principles to be used by both federal and State courts. The argument here is simply 
that State legislatures and executives should not be awarded any deference in what is 
purely a question of interpretive definition.  
To find otherwise would be to allow States in a sense to legislatively create 
“potential life,” the protection of which the Supreme Court in Roe and its progeny has 
held can be weighed in drafting abortion regulations. Ronald Dworkin has painted a 
colorful picture of what would be possible were States to have the constitutional authority 
to add persons to the constitutional order; one in which newspapers become extinct as a 
result of protecting the due process rights of trees and corporations could vote elect one 
of their own as a United States Senator for the State of Delaware.66 This would be 
possible because “the suggestion that the Constitution allows States to bestow 
personhood on fetuses assumes . . . . that a State can curtail constitutional rights by 
adding new persons to the constitutional population, to the list of those whose 
constitutional rights are competitive with one another.”67 These absurdities illustrate 
 
65 See U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that federal law is “the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges 
in every State shall be bound thereby”). 
66 See RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION 113–14 (1993).  
67 Id. at 113.  
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further the problems with allowing States to justify limitations on access to the morning-
after-pill based on the States’ determinations as to when life begins.  
The conclusion that State legislatures and executives are entitled no deference 
does not offend respect for the States as sovereigns. Not even Congress has the 
interpretive power to legislate constitutional meaning.68 While Congress does receive 
some deference from the courts in matters on which the Supreme Court has not yet 
ruled,69 this makes sense in light of its nationwide authority, which alleviates the 
uniformity concerns mentioned above.70 
The preceding discussion provides at least two partial answers to the question of 
why the issues presented by challenges to limitations on access to the morning-afterpill 
are distinguishable from a hypothetical review of State statutes defining death in the 
context of murder statutes. First, the definition at issue in the latter context involves 
interpretation of state law, not federal. As such, federalism concerns regarding 
interpretation of the federal Constitution are not present. Second, and consequently, the 
interest in universality of the definition is insubstantial. It should be noted, however, that 
even in this context, States themselves have felt compelled to achieve universality. This 
is why most States have adopted the Uniform Determination of Death Act.71 
ii. State Authority and Belief 
 
The second problem for State legislatures and executives is tied to the concept of 
belief. Given that only belief can presently answer the question of when potential life first 
exists, only belief can possibly justify any State’s declared definition of when pregnancy 
 
68 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519–20 (1997) (holding that Congress “has been given the power 
‘to enforce,’ not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation”) 
69 See id. 
70 See text accompanying note 63.  
71 See FURROW, supra note 16 at 215. 
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or potential life begins. As such, current Supreme Court substantive due process doctrine 
would never allow such a belief to significantly impair the individual liberties of 
American people.  
While questions of belief seem to touch freedom of religion more than any other 
individual right, the Supreme Court has made clear that the right to develop one’s own 
beliefs is encompassed within the liberty rights protected by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment,72 limiting States’ authority to resolve questions of belief.73 
The Court’s reasoning in Casey illustrates this well. There, the Court found that the 
“conventional constitutional doctrine that where reasonable people disagree the 
government can adopt one position or the other,” did not apply when the State, in so 
adopting, intruded upon protected liberties.74 In words prophetically applicable to our 
current discussion, the Court Stated: “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's 
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. 
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they 
formed under compulsion of the State.”75 
Casey does not stand alone in protecting personal belief from State intrusion. The 
Court had previously declared that “a State may not adopt one theory of when life begins 
to justify its regulation of abortion.”76 Further, Lawrence v. Texas,77 stands for the 
proposition that States may not enforce a belief that homosexual sodomy is immoral.78 
72 U.S. CONST. Am. XIV § 1; see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850–51 (1992).  
73 
74 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
75 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
76 Akron v. Akron Ctr. For Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983).  
77 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
78 See id. at 571, 578. 
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This line of cases stands firmly for the premise that States have no authority to legislate 
belief.  
The Supreme Court has stated that Roe “implies no limitation on the authority of a 
State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion.”79 Such a value 
judgment, however, does not amount to State imposition of its beliefs, but rather State 
declaration of its beliefs. The Court has been clear that due process forbids States from 
reaching the imposition stage. As one scholar puts it: “Obviously, the question of the 
precise moment of ensoulment (assuming that there is such a thing) is none of Caesar’s 
concern.”80 
Certainly, the First Amendment may also present obstacles for State 
determinations regarding the morning-after-pill.81 The question of how to define 
pregnancy has the potential to touch both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of 
the First Amendment.82 This Article focuses, however, on substantive due process, and, 
as such, full discussion of the First Amendment’s effects on analysis of the question 
before us is beyond the scope of the present discussion.  
iii. State Assertion of Public Health Concerns 
The State interest often asserted for restrictions on the morning-after-pill, of 
course, will be more paternalistic than philosophical. The FDA has already latched onto a 
dearth of research as to the morning-after-pill’s effects on women under age sixteen to 
 
79 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977). 
80 Arnold H. Loewy, Morals Legislation and the Establishment Clause, 55 ALA. L. REV. 159, 180–81 
(2003).  
81 See id. (implying that a State determination of when life begins would violate the Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment). 
82 U.S. CONST. Am. I.  
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justify attempts to limiting over-the-counter access to the drug.83 Protecting the health of 
its citizens is certainly a legitimate State interest.84 Courts have a responsibility, however, 
to ensure that a State assertion that it is acting to protect citizens cannot serve as 
smokescreen to justify an otherwise improper moral imposition on those citizens.85 
Nothing suggests that State concerns over the effects on the morning-after-pill are 
anything more than smokescreen. There has, indeed, been widespread speculation that the 
FDA’s use of the public health justification is disingenuous, masking political pressures 
from those who have moral problems with the morning-after-pill.86 The morning-after-
pill does cause stomach pain, nausea, and vomiting in some women.87 It is not 
reasonable, however, to think that FDA is withholding wider access to the morning-after-
pill on the threat of a stomachache. After extensive research, the morning-after-pill, 
contrary to RU-486, has not produced any serious side effects at any age level.88 Thus, 
basing limits on access on the rationale that effects on teens are uncertain seems 
unreasonable at best and insincere at worst.  
b. Deciding Between Contraception and Abortion Law Requires Courts to 
Derive the American People’s Moral Opinion as to Whether the 
Constitution Treats the Morning-after-pill as Abortion or Contraception 
 
Having answered the question of whether State governments have the authority to 
impose their view about life’s commencement in the negative, constitutional judges 
facing challenges to access limitations are not yet out of the woods. These judges must 
still decide whether to apply contraception or abortion law. As such, they must decide 
 
83 Gardiner Harris, Drugs, Politics, and the F.D.A., N.Y. TIMES 11 (Aug. 25, 2005). The FDA subsequently 
approved over-the-counter access to the drug for those over the age of eighteen. 
84 See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24–29 (1905). 
85 See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. 
Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1238 (2004). 
86 CITE EDITORIALS 
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whether the Constitution should recognize the existence of human life at the time of 
conception.  
The discussion above provides a structural answer to why judges may 
appropriately answer this question. The matter involves constitutional interpretation, the 
province of the courts. The second concern discussed above, that the government may not 
impose its beliefs on the people, makes it less clear that courts are entitled to decide this 
question. Would judges themselves not be imposing their own beliefs on the people (and 
not just the people of one State, but the American people as a whole) were they to answer 
the question one way or another?  
This Part seeks first to alleviate this fear, as well as the corresponding concern 
that one or several judges may displace the will of the majority. Second, it seeks to 
provide for constitutional judges a blueprint for how to analyze the question of when the 
Constitution first recognizes the existence of potential life.  
i. Judicial Imposition of Belief and Majoritarian Concerns 
 
The concern that judges will simply replace a State’s belief about when potential 
human life begins with their own in adopting a constitutional definition of pregnancy is a 
valid one. “[A]bsent an authoritative source of bonos mores, judges necessarily bring to 
bear their own moral positions any time they review the legal sufficiency of a morals-
based rationale.”89 Fortunately, however, judges do have such an authoritative source: the 
American people.   
Judges should view their charge in answering constitutional questions involving 
moral dilemmas as finding the American people’s opinion as to the best way to resolve 
the complex web of questions involved. In the context of our discussion, this means that 
 
89 Goldberg, supra note 82, at 1288. 
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judges must determine not only the American people’s beliefs as to the question of when 
life begins, but also the people’s beliefs as to what effect the people would want their 
beliefs as to when life begins to have on the judicial process. “Constructing the American 
people’s conception of justice is not the same thing as expressing one’s own conception 
of justice or as expressing the best conception of justice, whatever that may mean.”90 As 
long as judges remain true to their charge, there is no reason to fear their rulings as 
impositions of belief on the people, for the beliefs being imposed are those of the people.  
While judges drawing upon a set of mores beyond their own may seem 
implausible, judges at the highest level already do so. Casey is a wonderful example of 
judges doing just that.91 The Court in Casey reaffirmed the “essential holding” of Roe,
that women have the right to choose to have an abortion before viability of a fetus.92 Yet 
the Opinion of the Court, written by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, states 
expressly: “Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic principles 
of morality.”93 The Justices nonetheless believed that a higher morality than their own 
had to control their analysis.94 
It is noteworthy here that, as discussed in more detail below, the beliefs that 
should be judicially implemented are not simply those about when life begins, but also 
about how this first set of beliefs should effect? the legal rights of the people.95 Thus, 
courts impose not even the American people’s beliefs regarding when life begins, but 
rather attempt to provide the contextual application of the people’s concept of justice. 
 
90 EISGRUBER, supra note 8 at 126. 
91 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992). 
92 See id. at 846. 
93 Id. at 850. 
94 See id.
95 See infra, text accompanying notes 112–19. 
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Most simply put, this Article argues that judges should interpret the Constitution as 
would the American people.  
The majoritarian concerns that some will continue to have with this Article’s 
propositions have been dealt with adeptly by Eisgruber, who reveals these concerns as a 
misunderstanding of the nature of democracy.96 While neither he, nor much less I, will 
ever convince all of those who maintain a contrary view of democracy, it is worthwhile to 
discuss how the conception of democracy assumed in this Article answers traditional 
majoritarian concerns regarding active judicial review on questions such as the 
constitutional definition of pregnancy.  
Properly viewed, “judicial review is, among other things, a device for regulating 
federalism. It is an institution through which the national government supervises State 
and local institutions.”97 This supervision is necessary precisely because democracy 
constitutes something more than deriving the will of the majority.98 It charges 
government with the duty to represent all of the people.99 “The democratic character of 
moral decision-making . . . turns on the character of the government’s reasons, not on the 
sheer size of the constituency for those reasons.”100 Judges (federal in particular), because 
of the ties to mainstream politics required to ascend to the bench, and because of the 
nature of judicial office once they do get there, including insulation from those same 
politics and the obligation to issue public, reasoned opinions, are well-suited to ensure the 
highest character of the reasons for the government’s moral decision-making.101 
96 EISGRUBER, supra note 8 
97 Id. at 92. 
98 Eisgruber, supra note 53, at 121 (arguing that “democracy is government by the whole people, and a 
majority is by definition only a fraction of the people”). 
99 Id. 
100 Eisgruber, supra note 53, at 123.  
101 EISGRUBER, supra note 8 at 71. 
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Moreover, simple majoritarian decision-making is ill-suited for complex moral 
policy questions. Indeed, perhaps the most significant problem with pure majoritarianism 
in the context of moral decision-making is that the majority often fails to use sound moral 
reasoning in reaching its decisions, rather succumbing to self-interest. Certainly this can 
be seen to the extent we equate the legislative process with expression of majoritarian 
views. Imagine that the question of when the Constitution should first recognize the 
existence of potential life was put squarely before Congress for an up-or-down vote. 
Realistically, the vast majority of Senators and Congressmen would base their decision 
not on any reasoned moral analysis, but rather on polling data and how pro-life or pro-
choice those polls tell them they should appear to their constituents.102 
Self-interest does not have to be so tangible.103 Self-interest includes interests in 
avoiding exposure to offensive conduct.104 It is for this reason that rationales underlying 
government regulation of certain aspects of sexual behavior create unique constitutional 
concerns.105 “Comingl[ing] intense pleasures, dark power relationships, and mysteries of 
human creation. . . . rivets attention and frustrates understanding.”106 As a result, 
 
First, judges have life tenure and good jobs; hence they are insulated from the pull of interests 
that might distort the judgment of other decision-makers. Second, judges’ votes often have a 
decisive impact, hence judges have an incentive to take personal responsibility for their 
choices. Third, judges must give a public account their reasoning; hence they put their 
reputation for fairness on the line whenever they issue a decision. Fourth, judges are 
appointed on the basis of their political views and political connections; hence their views of 
justice are unlikely to be radically at odds with the American mainstream 
Id. 
102 See generally Comment, Jason M. Horst, Imaginary Intent: The California Supreme Court’s Search for 
a Legislative Intent that Does Not Exist, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 1045, 1063–67 (2005) (discussing the self-
interest involved in the legislative process in California). 
103 Eisgruber, supra note 53 at 134 (stating that “[s]elf-interest is not reducible to material or economic self-
interest”). 
104 Id. at 134. 
105 EISGRUBER, supra note 8 at 159. 
106 EISGRUBER, supra note 8 at 158–59. 
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individuals tend to define themselves by condemning the sexual practices of others.107 As 
such, Eisgruber has suggested that judges must take care to ensure that State regulations 
do not “condition fundamental benefits of citizenship . . . upon whether a person 
conforms to the State’s judgments about how to pursue sexual pleasure in a way that is 
proper rather than debasing.”108 Ronald Dworkin has referred to this right as the right to 
moral independence, and framed it more precisely: 
People have the right not to suffer disadvantage in the distribution of 
social goods and opportunities, including disadvantage in the liberties 
permitted to them by the criminal law, just on the ground that their 
officials or fellow-citizens think that their opinions about the right way for 
them to lead their own lives are ignoble or wrong.109 
Applied specifically to our present discussion, this concept requires judges to 
scrutinize State limitations on access to the morning-after-pill in order to ensure that such 
limitations are not based upon an animus toward unplanned, unprotected sexual 
intercourse. While enforcing such animus would be constitutionally prohibited, it seems 
at first illogical that this bias actually drives State limitations on the morning-after-pill. 
No less than the morning-after-pill—and indeed to an arguably far greater degree—birth 
control pills and patches facilitate the same sexual practices. Why then, should the pill 
and patch be so easily obtained and the morning-after-pill require parental involvement? 
There seems to be a strong possibility that, despite the insignificance of the morning-
after-pill’s effect on unplanned unprotected sex, the variation exists due to the majority’s 
inclination to view themselves? as sexually responsible. Because the morning-after-pill 
“is employed after intercourse. . . . it may have particular appeal to the occasional sex 
 
107 EISGRUBER, supra note 8 at 159. 
108 EISGRUBER, supra note 8 at 160. 
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consumer for use as an alternative to pre-intercourse regimens.”110 Women who have 
unplanned, unprotected sex who have prepared for that eventuality by using continual 
hormonal birth control methods may be widely viewed as responsible, especially by 
comparison. Those women themselves make up at least one quarter of all women in the 
United States.111 In fact, more than ninety percent of all women in America use some 
form of birth control.112 
Thus, upon further reflection, there is actually significant risk that government 
action restricting access to the morning-after-pill, in actuality, manifests a majority’s 
attempt to define itself by condemning actions it views as sexually irresponsible. It seems 
quite unlikely, however, that the American people, even a majority of them, would 
believe such a rationale would be legitimate to justify the way the law treats women who 
seek access to the drug.  
Certainly, the Supreme Court has not endowed morality-based legislation with its 
imprimatur simply because it was created through the majoritarian process. Rather, the 
Court’s reasoning in Lawrence backs a counter-majoritarian view of constitutional 
democracy. For the majority, Justice Kennedy asserted that “the fact that the governing 
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a 
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”113 Justice Stevens has 
echoed this sentiment, stating that “the individual’s freedom to choose his own creed is 
 
110 June Mary Zekan Makdisi, Genetically Correct: The Political Use of Reproductive Terminology, 32 
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111 Allen Guttmacher Institute, Get in the Know: Prevention and Contraception, available at 
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the counterpart of his right to refrain from accepting the creed established by the 
majority.”114 
Lawrence clearly supports the premise that the majority’s condemnation of a 
group of people, in that case homosexuals, is an unconstitutional justification for a law.115 
Here, neither can the majority’s condemnation of those who are irresponsible in their 
sexuality justify a constitutional definition of pregnancy. Judicial review, carefully 
reasoning through each of the moral issues involved through the lens of the American 
people’s beliefs, can ensure States cannot employ such motives. 
ii. Answering the Question: Webs of Belief and Super-
Majoritarianism 
 
At last we arrive to the beginning. How should constitutional courts attack the 
question at the heart of challenges to State limitations on access to the morning-after-pill? 
As is hopefully becoming clear by now, that question is not the question of when life, 
potential life, or pregnancy begins. The question before these courts is whether the 
Constitution should recognize the existence of potential life at the time of fertilization.  
This Article has argued that judges attacking this question should draw from the 
American people’s beliefs. To the extent they are even accurately ascertainable, 
Americans beliefs regarding what Rebecca Brown calls the “First-Order Question,”116 
that is their actual beliefs as to when life begins, play only a supporting role in this 
analysis. This is because the beliefs are only part of a complex web of beliefs held by the 
people. Americans often hold numerous beliefs that at least potentially conflict. 
Constitutional judges must, therefore, look to Americans’ First-Order beliefs in the 
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context of their other beliefs, rather than in a vacuum. As such, the more important set of 
beliefs, from the perspective of our constitutional judges, is a “Second-Order” set of 
beliefs regarding the effect that the First-Order beliefs should have on law and the rights 
of others.  
 This Part argues that Americans are generally disinclined to want their First-
Order beliefs to affect the legal rights of others and that they believe such an effect is 
permissible only if a supermajority of the people share the belief. As such, it argues that 
courts may find that the Constitution recognizes the existence of potential life at the time 
of fertilization only if a supermajority of the American people believes that it exists at 
that point.  
Indicia of the American people’s beliefs regarding both abortion and 
homosexuality both lend themselves to the conclusion that Americans generally want 
their beliefs separated from their laws. Lawrence details the fact that, at the time of the 
decision, only thirteen States expressly outlawed homosexual sodomy, and less than a 
third of those States actually enforced their laws.117 Given that half of all American adults 
have an unfavorable view of homosexuals,118 one would think that if Americans believed 
that their beliefs should always control their laws, the number of States that actively 
regulated homosexuality would have been higher while such regulation was still 
considered constitutional. This phenomenon cannot necessarily be explained away by 
reliance on the concept that homosexuality is an immutable characteristic. As many 
Americans believe that homosexuals can change their sexual orientation if they wished as 
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believe to the contrary.119 More than sixty percent believe that being gay is not 
preordained at birth.120 Yet, even when it was legal to do so?, the American people 
overwhelmingly chose not to use the force of the law to propagate their beliefs.? There is 
a distinct divide between belief and the law. It can be so only because the American 
people want it that way.  
Examination of Americans’ beliefs about abortion and the law reveal the same 
phenomenon. The American people have long been of the belief that their personal 
feelings about abortion should not dictate the rights of other to obtain an abortion. A Los 
Angeles Times poll conducted in 2000 revealed that while more than half of all 
Americans believed abortion to be murder, less than a quarter supported a constitutional 
amendment banning the practice.121 Likewise, a recent poll revealed that seventy-eight 
percent of Americans believe that abortion should be legal in at least some 
circumstances.122 
Again, all of this supports the premise that Americans prefer their beliefs to be 
separated from their law when lack of separation would affect individual liberties. As 
such, judges attempting to derive the American people’s beliefs as to questions such as 
when the Constitution should first recognize the existence of potential life should begin 
with a presumption that if the finding one way would restrict personal freedoms, the 
American people would find the decision unsatisfactory. As such, it would be an 
improper constitutional interpretation.  
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Because constitutional recognition of potential life at any one point along the 
continuum leading to live birth clearly limits personal freedoms at all later points, 
however, any definition that places the point of recognition anywhere before live birth is 
presumptively improper.? Can this be right? Clearly, this seems irreconcilable with Roe 
and Casey, the death knell for a framework aspiring towards any legitimacy.   
Data from the newer abortion poll mentioned above, however, pulls out another 
string in the web of the American people’s Second-Order beliefs. It is this string that ties 
the proposed framework back together. Three quarters of Americans believed that 
abortion should be illegal in some contexts.123 Thus, there is a significant consensus that 
at some point, beliefs of others should trump those of individuals seeking to act in a 
certain way. Put another way, Americans appear to overwhelmingly think that their 
individual beliefs should not affect the scope of constitutional rights if that belief does not 
hold enough popular appeal.  
Logically, if there is a place on the continuum between potential life and life 
where enough people believe sanctity of the latter has been bestowed on a fetus such as to 
impose that belief on others, there too must be a point on the continuum of non-existence 
to existence of potential life at which this happens. If this is true, then surely 
constitutional judges must account for the exceptional situations in which the vast 
majority of society as a whole believes that the law should not protect certain beliefs. But 
how can we separate the beliefs that carry with them the right to act on them from those 
that do not? 
This Article argues that constitutional judges, at least in the context of our present 
discussion, should adopt a super-majoritarian principle such that the presumption against 
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the propriety of a constitutional definition that limits individual rights can be rebutted 
only on a finding that a supermajority, at least seventy-five percent of the people, shares a 
belief. Thus, judges should find the Constitution recognizes the existence of potential life 
at the point of conception only if a supermajority of Americans believes that to be true.  
The reflexive response to this premise will likely be hostile. On reflection, 
however, constitutional structure, case law, and the whole of criminal law each support 
the idea.  
1. Super-Majoritarianism and Constitutional Structure 
 
The first amongst the parade of horribles that may come from opponents of this 
idea is the exasperated: “Well, then may Christians act so as to give constitutional effect 
to a declaration that Jesus is the One and only true God?” The simple answer is yes. 
Clearly they may. The slightly more complex answer is that nothing in the substantive 
due process analysis I have proposed would prevent it. Currently such a declaration runs 
afoul of the express language of the First Amendment, but Article V of the 
Constitution124 contains provisions for amending the constitution in the event that three-
quarters of each House of Congress of two-thirds of States propose to do so and three 
quarters of States ratify the proposed amendment.125 As of 2001, seventy-seven percent 
of Americans self-identified as Christians.126 It is far from beyond comprehension that 
Christians could thus control enough State and federal offices to effect the change if they 
so desired. The fact that they have not done so despite possessing a supermajority is 
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telling. Americans place an even greater premium on the right to define one’s own God 
than they do on the right to legal protection of one’s definition of life or life potential.  
The broader point here is that the Constitution is in no way offended by allowing 
a supermajority to define it. Eisgruber argues that these same provisions make clear that 
the Constitution does not view democracy as majoritarianism.127 While this is clearly 
true, it obviously does not follow that super-majoritarian decision-making offends the 
super-majoritarian structure of the Constitution. Indeed, nothing in the Constitution could 
reasonably be said to prevent the return of slavery through recourse to its amendment 
procedures. What prevents the United States from becoming a Christian theocracy fueled 
by slave labor is the fact that the American people believe such a society to be unjust.  
2. Super-Majoritarianism and Precedent  
 
Additionally, case law regarding reproductive rights under substantive due 
process can only be explained satisfactorily by super-majoritarian principles. Roe and 
Casey both provide significantly different protection from State efforts to restrict a 
woman’s right to choose whether to abort a fetus depending on how far along in the 
pregnancy she is.128 Under Roe, a woman had an almost unqualified right to choose to 
abort a fetus until viability.129 Under Casey, the qualification on this right is still 
relatively minor until viability.130 At the point of viability, however, something happens 
that completely eviscerates the woman’s right.131 The Roe Court contends that this 
something is that the fetus “then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside 
 
127 See EISGRUBER, supra note 8. 
128 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–66 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869–77 
(1992). 
129 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
130 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 872–77. 
131 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163; Casey, 505 U.S. at 869–77. 
41
the mother's womb,” giving States compelling “logical and biological justifications” for 
regulations barring abortions at this stage.132 The Casey decision also relies expressly on 
this general premise and additionally on the prospect that “it might be said that a woman 
who fails to act before viability has consented to the State’s intervention on behalf of the 
developing child.”133 
Neither rationale set forth by the Court, however, is fully satisfactory. Roe rests in 
part on fact that the Constitution does not recognize fetuses as persons, though it also 
recognizes a State interest in protecting their potential lives.134 Strangely, however, Roe 
gives no effect to the State’s power to protect potential life until the point of viability.135 
At that point, the State has complete authority to disregard the rights of a person 
protected by the Constitution’s provisions in order to protect a non-person, protected by 
no constitutional provision. While this Article will be far from the first to critique Roe,136 
the fact remains that this reasoning seems fishy.  
The Court’s decision makes much more sense, however, under the theory that the 
Court simply believed that by the time a fetus has become viable, the vast majority of 
society believes that a fetus has been bestowed with personhood and thus undoubtedly 
deserves protection of its own. By the point of viability, fetuses have kicked with 
developing legs hundreds of times and are commonly thought to have already developed 
personalities.137 It seems far from unreasonable that for a supermajority of the population, 
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terminating a pregnancy at that stage simply offends common sensibilities. It is unlikely 
that the Court would be blind to this fact.  
The reasoning in Casey lends itself even more to this theory. While parroting 
Roe’s justification for the viability standard, the Casey Court premised its decision 
upholding Roe on the fact that “[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”138 Adding the 
addendum “until your fetus reaches viability” to this sweeping liberty makes sense only if 
there is a new person to consider. If potential life in some form exists prior to viability, 
why should it not receive as much protection earlier? If we are to accept the Justices’ 
profession that they were acting out of an “obligation . . . to define liberty for all”139 at 
the expense of at least some of their own moral views, the holding in the case makes most 
sense if the Justices had believed that the American public, for the most part, believed 
that a viable fetus was a person, something that the public did not widely believe prior to 
viability. Certainly, the Court’s unusually equivocal language in its suggestion that a 
woman has waived her constitutional rights by the point of viability, its only other 
justification, seems at the very least to be less than heartfelt. Moreover, as discussed, 
above, States cannot legitimately rely on characterizations of women as irresponsible to 
justify its regulations.140 
Carey v. Population Services International141 also provides precedential support 
for the premise that super-majoritarian principles are consistent with the Court’s 
substantive due process decisions with respect to reproductive rights at the other end of 
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the spectrum. In Carey, the Court held that it was unconstitutional for New York to limit 
access to contraceptives to those 16-years-old and above by restricting the right to sell 
non-prescription contraceptives to licensed pharmacists.142 Likewise, the Court garnered 
a majority to hold that married individuals between 14 and 16-years-old were 
constitutionally protected from outright prohibition of access to contraception.143 The 
argument that those under 16 and unmarried could not be constitutionally denied 
contraception, however, could not command a majority of the Court.144 
These three holdings seem best reconciled with one another in light of the super-
majoritarian analysis set forth above. A supermajority of the population would be quite 
unlikely to believe that any personally held belief regarding the morality of contraception 
should affect the rights of either consenting adults or married couples from choosing how 
they want to have sex. On the other hand, a supermajority may well believe that one 
under the age of 16 and unmarried has not yet reached the point at which the Constitution 
should first protect that right. 
Tying back into the discussion of the morning-after-pill, the Carey Court’s refusal 
to recognize a right of unmarried children under the age of 16 to contraception is thus 
analogous to finding first that a supermajority believes the Constitution should not yet 
recognize the existence of potential life at the point just before ovulation (a fairly safe 
bet.) 
None of this, of course, means that the Courts in any of these cases consciously 
adopted and adhered to a super-majoritarian analytical framework like the one proposed 
in this Article, nor even that the cases would necessarily come out the same had they 
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expressly done so. This discussion has simply sought to show that the general reasoning 
of the framework offered is at least as, if not more, plausible a defense for the holdings in 
these cases as any offered in the cases themselves.  
iii. Super-Majoritarianism and a Functioning Society  
 
Finally, a framework in which a presumption that any constitutional definition 
that infringes on personal freedoms may be rebutted on a finding that a supermajority 
believes the law should indeed infringe on those freedoms is ever-present, and essential 
in a functioning society. All of criminal law is based upon the same premise. The reason 
that we may put criminals in prison, that we can deprive them of numerous freedoms and 
liberties, is that a supermajority of our society believes that it is permissible to imprison 
criminals. Even though there may be great disagreement over the types of crimes 
deserving of such punishment and the appropriate length of prison terms, the underlying 
premise is accepted to a degree far beyond any of the beliefs discussed above.  
The distinction between the legal effect of a belief that the state can imprison 
criminals and a belief about whether potential life exists at a given point of embryonic 
development, however, is simply a matter of the degree to which the beliefs are generally 
held. As such, a belief that potential life exists at some point prior to the first electrical 
brain activity will almost certainly be so widely held as to unblinkingly justify treating 
any action to prevent live birth at that point as abortion.145 Whether it is permissible to 
treat such actions as abortion at the point of fertilization is a more difficult question 
purely due to the fact that it is far from clear whether a supermajority of the public 
believes doing so is permissible.  
iv. Derivation and Discretion  
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As one would imagine, courts are not in any position to take a head-count of 
Americans in their attempts to elicit the people’s First and Second-Order beliefs and 
reconcile the two. Likewise, empirical data regarding Americans’ beliefs and practices 
surrounding the moral question itself may be infected by a general lack of knowledge 
regarding the biology involved.  
For example, the birth control pill is the most widely used birth control method in 
America.146 Of all women who use contraceptives, over one third use the Birth Control 
Pill147 or some other form of hormonal contraceptive methods such as the Patch or an 
intrauterine device.148 The public nearly universally views these birth control methods as 
contraceptives. As it turns out, these methods all operate essentially identically to the 
morning-after-pill.149 A court may thus be initially inclined to take this as a solid 
indication that Americans believe that drugs which function in this way should be treated 
as contraception. Anything more than a cursory investigation, however, will lead the 
court to discover that if a young woman does not understand medical terminology such as 
implantation, there is little opportunity to learn that hormonal measures to prevent 
pregnancy may operate after an egg has been fertilized. Not surprisingly, nothing on 
either packaging for the drugs or informational websites account for the possibility that a 
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woman may consider terminating embryonic development once fertilization has occurred 
an abortion.150 
This goes simply to say that Constitutional judges will, therefore, have to exercise 
their own moral reasoning to a certain degree in attempting to determine whether a 
supermajority of the American people share a moral and political belief. A full discussion 
of what evidence they should consider along the way and the relative weight it should 
bare must be left for another time. As indicated above, however, as long as these judges 
remain true to their call as representatives of the American people, there is nothing to fear 
in their exercise of discretion.  
CONCLUSION 
Challenges to State efforts to restrict women’s access to the morning-after-pill 
have the potential to present the courts with a question they hoped never to have to 
answer and one that many see as unfit for judicial determination. Nevertheless, when the 
question is properly viewed as one of federal constitutional interpretation, it becomes 
clear not only that constitutional courts are not only the most appropriate body of 
government to answer it, but also that they are quite capable of doing so in a manner 
consistent with the best understanding of the judicial role. Through adopting a 
presumption against a definition that infringes on individual liberty, rebuttable on a 
finding of multiple super-majoritarian beliefs, judges effectively fill their roles as 
defenders of the rights of all the people. As such, States attempting to get constitutional 
judges to give constitutional effect to their beliefs that potential life exists at the point of 
conception have an incredibly high, though not necessarily insurmountable, burden. This 
is as the American people would want it. 
 
150 
47
